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A B S T R A C T
Background: In spite of globalizing processes ‘ofﬂine’ retail drugmarkets remain localized and – in recent
decades – typically ‘closed’, in which dealers sell primarily to known customers. We characterize drug
cryptomarkets as ‘anonymous open’marketplaces that allow the diffusion of drugs across locales.Where
cryptomarket customers make stock-sourcing purchases for ofﬂine distribution, the cryptomarket may
indirectly serve drug userswho are not themselves cryptomarket customers, thereby increasing the drug
diffusing capacity of these marketplaces. Our research aimed to identify wholesale activity on the ﬁrst
major cryptomarket, Silk Road 1.
Methods: Data were collected 13–15 September 2013. A bespokeweb crawler downloaded content from
the ﬁrst major drug cryptomarket, Silk Road 1. This generated data on 1031 vendors and 10,927 drug
listings. We estimated monthly revenues to ascertain the relative importance of wholesale priced
listings.
Results: Wholesale-level revenue generation (sales for listings priced over USD $1000.00) accounted for
about a quarter of the revenue generation on SR1 overall. Ecstasy-type drugs dominated wholesale
activity on this marketplace, but we also identiﬁed substantial wholesale transactions for
benzodiazepines and prescription stimulants. Less important, but still generating wholesale revenue,
were cocaine, methamphetamine and heroin. Although vendors on the marketplace were located in
41 countries, wholesale activity was conﬁned to only a quarter of these, with China, the Netherlands,
Canada and Belgium prominent.
Conclusions: The cryptomarket may function in part as a virtual broker, linking wholesalers with ofﬂine
retail-level distributors. For drugs like ecstasy, these marketplaces may link vendors in producer
countries directly with retail level suppliers. Wholesale activity on cryptomarkets may serve to increase
the diffusion of newdrugs – andwider range of drugs – in ofﬂine drugmarkets, thereby indirectly serving
drug users who are not cryptomarket customers themselves. Cryptomarkets provide researchers and
policy makers with a rich source of drug monitoring information. Further research should ascertain
whether their virtual location may reduce the violence associated with middle market drug activity. We
caution that conﬂict may instead manifest in other ways, including threats, fraud, and blackmail.
Crown Copyright 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
A cryptomarket is an online marketplace platform bringing
together multiple vendors listing mostly illegal goods and services
for sale. Predominant on these markets is the sale of illegal and
illicit drugs (Aldridge & De´cary-He´tu, 2014; Barratt, Ferris, &
Winstock, 2014; Christin, 2013; Martin, 2013; Van Hout &* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: judith.aldridge@manchester.ac.uk (J. Aldridge).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2016.04.020
0955-3959/Crown Copyright 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access arti
4.0/).Bingham, 2014).1 Cryptomarkets share the same look and feel of
‘clear web’ marketplaces like eBay and Amazon by allowing their
customers to search and compare products and vendors. What
differentiates these from established clear web marketplaces is
their hidden aspect. Cryptomarkets employ from amongst a range
of strategies to hide the identity of their participants and1 For an exception, see Dolliver (2015a) although note criticism of her
methodology (Aldridge and De´cary-He´tu, 2015; Dolliver, 2015b; Munksgaard,
Demant, & Branwen, 2016; Van Buskirk, Roxburgh, Naicker, & Burns 2015).
cle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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anonymization services like Tor that hide a computer’s IP address
when accessing the site (Lewman, 2016); and decentralized and
relatively untraceable cryptocurrencies like bitcoin for making
payments (Cox, 2016).
Since the closure of the ﬁrstmajor drug cryptomarket – Silk Road
1 (hereafter ‘SR10) – by the FBI in October 2013, many similar
marketplaces have emerged. Most tend to be short-lived, with
longevity hamperedmore as a result ofmarketplace scams than law
enforcement interventions (Branwen, 2014). Over the past year, we
have seen the emergence of single ‘vendor shops’, often specializing
in one or a few drug types. The tally at the time of writing includes
30 multi-vendor primarily drug marketplaces (of which 7 are non-
English) and 16 single vendor markets (deepdotweb, 2016).
In spiteof their proliferationandphenomenal growth (Aldridge&
De´cary-He´tu, 2016), cryptomarkets represent only a tiny fraction of
theglobaldrugs trade (Aldridge&De´cary-He´tu, 2016).Nevertheless,
drugcryptomarkets represent anewwayof ‘doingbusiness’, holding
the potential to transform local ofﬂine markets for illegal drugs by
providing a new channel for drug diffusion across locales. The
precisemechanisms for diffusion, however, will depend onwhether
cryptomarkets cater for a retailmarket only, orwhether they serve a
wholesale function as well. If these marketplaces serve an
exclusively retail function – in which transactions take place only
with customers who are drug users buying for their personal use –
then the drug diffusing capacity of cryptomarkets will be created
insofar as more and more drug users become cryptomarket
customers. On the other hand, if cryptomarkets involve wholesale
purchases by customers sourcing stock to distribute in local ofﬂine
markets, then the drug diffusing capacity of these online market-
places will be substantially increased: cryptomarket-sourced drugs
would become available even to drug users who are not themselves
cryptomarket customers. Our aim in this paper is to characterize the
supply side of cryptomarkets. This will be achieved by identifying
the existence of wholesale level transactions on SR1, the drug types
associated with these transactions, and the countries from which
vendors making wholesale transactions ship, and are likely based.
We consider our results in light of their cryptomarkets’ potential to
facilitate drug diffusion, to reduce violence associated with ofﬂine
drug markets, and their utility in the form of drug information
systems that provide ‘early warning’ in comparison to existing
approaches.
The cryptomarket: an ‘anonymous open’ drug market that transcends
locale
Access to illegal drugs across the globe is uneven. In spite of the
globalizing processes that have shaped local drug markets in
recent decades (Seddon, 2008), local drugs markets remain
structured by international economic relationships between
countries (Boivin, 2014) and available and evolving trafﬁcking
routes (UNODC, 2012). This is reﬂected in the highly varying
patterns and prevalence of illicit drug taking globally (see for
example Degenhardt et al., 2008). Before the advent of Internet-
facilitated drug buying, drug users typically sourced their drugs
from local retail dealers operating in geographically restricted
locales (Reuter, 1983), or via ‘social supply’, or ‘sorting’ through
friends who did so on their behalf (Aldridge, Measham, &Williams,
2011; Coomber & Moyle, 2013).
Prior to the 1990s, retail drug markets were typically ‘open’
markets in which dealers sold to any customer – known and
unknown (Harocopos & Hough, 2005). The advent of pagers and
mobile phone technology shifted many drug markets from ‘open’
to ‘closed’, in which dealers sold to known customers, acquiring
new ones only through ‘trusted’ introductions (May & Hough,
2004). Whether open or closed, the number of customers a dealercan transactwith in the ‘ofﬂine’ realm is time and space limited: for
drugs and cash to change hands, buyers and sellers have to meet.
The possibilities for retail drug dealers to expand their customer
base is not only restricted by the necessity of accessing customers
within geographical reach, but also as a result of local competition,
inability to advertise, and the risks involved in expanding illegal
operations (Reuter, 1983). Violencewithin thesemarkets, although
rare, is also a risk faced by drug suppliers, who do not have recourse
to state institutionswhen conﬂict arises (Reuter, 2009), making the
expansion of operations for drug dealers a risky proposition.
Drug cryptomarkets represent an important drug market
innovation through their capacity to transcend these limitations.
Firstly, drug vendors operating on these markets are able to
interact with unknown customers, with the trust facilitated via the
anonymitymechanisms built in to themarketplace (Martin, 2014).
In this sense, we characterize drug cryptomarkets as ‘anonymous
open’ drug markets. Secondly, in contrast to ofﬂine drug markets
where dealers cannot easily and publicly advertise their services,
vendors operating on drug cryptomarkets can openly advertise
their products for sale to anyone who accesses the marketplace
across the globe, even gaining online ‘reputation’ scores from the
positive (or negative) feedback left by customers in the style of
eBay-style online marketplaces. Thirdly, cryptomarket vendors
will be less restricted by local competition than their ofﬂine
counterparts, who must compete with other dealers in fairly
tightly restricted geographical locations, or else relocate their
operations (Morselli, Turcotte, & Tenti, 2011). Cryptomarket
vendors, in contrast, have access to a customer base that is widely
geographically dispersed – both within and across national
boundaries – potentially making local competition less relevant
and the risks associated with market expansion less problematic.
As well, cryptomarkets have regulatory mechanisms (escrow,
seller and buyer trust metrics, marketplace adjudication of
disputes – see Christin, 2013), removing some of the instability
in illegal markets that gives rise to conﬂict and violence. Their
location in the virtual sphere may make the violence associated
with drugmarkets, especially where suppliers seek to expand their
markets, less likely. By transcending the limitations of geography,
all these features of the cryptomarket have the potential to
increase the size and reach of the market vendors can access, in
comparison to retail drug dealers operating in ofﬂine drugmarkets.
Drug cryptomarkets may therefore provide a new mechanism
for the diffusion of speciﬁc drugs into new locales in which they
were previously unavailable. The diffusion concept has long been
used to examine how innovations are spread through social
systems (Rogers, 1983). Ferrence (2001), in a review of research
applying the diffusion model to drug taking, conﬁrmed its utility
for understanding how the use of new drugs or forms of use can
spread, but concluded that the model could be improved by
incorporating economic availability. Drug cryptomarkets may
provide a mechanism not only for the diffusion drugs across
locales, but one that allows researchers and policy makers to
monitor the availability of speciﬁc drugs by examining sales
generated on these marketplaces. Cryptomarkets may provide
those interested in ‘early warning systems’ with information that
moves beyond that captured by existing approaches.
We might expect however, certainly at this early stage in the
development of drug cryptomarkets, that the extent to which drug
users are aware of these marketplaces, and willing and able to
make purchases from them, will be limited. Research by Barratt
et al. (2014), using Global Drugs Survey data, suggests that even
among survey respondents who usually buy their own (primarily
recreational) drugs, access to drugs via SR1 was not widespread. In
Australia, the UK and the USA, 7%, 10% and 18% of the sample
(respectively) had consumed drugs purchased via SR1, and just
over half of these had self-purchased (so between 5 and 10%).
Table 1
Mean weight of drugs (g) listed for sale across price categories.
Number of listings Mean weight (g)
<$100.00 5328 7.96
$100.01–$500.00 3854 25.13
$500.01–$1000.00 830 90.29
$1000.00+ 915 402.17
Total 10,927 58.44
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markets is not inconsiderable and should be monitored, it is
unlikely at this stage that these marketplaces now play a
substantial role in drug diffusion solely through purchases made
by drug users for their own use. But what if cryptomarkets impact
on drug availability even for drug users who are not their
customers? Our own observations of SR1 during its time of
operation in 2012 and 2013 conﬁrmed the existence of high price/
quantity drugs listed for sale, and our preliminary analysis
presented in a working paper suggested that these listings
generated substantial sales revenue for vendors operating there
(Aldridge & De´cary-He´tu, 2014). This leads us to question the
market level of the cryptomarket: retail? Wholesale? Or both?
Others have characterized SR1 in ways that suggest it
functioned primarily for retail sales. Barratt (2012) described this
as a kind of ‘eBay for drugs’, and Christin (2013) referred to the
typically small quantities of drugs listed for sale there. Martin
(2013) speculated that SR1 might have functioned effectively to
bypass the wholesale ‘middle’ level of the drugs market, linking
importers and cultivators directly to drug using customers. If these
marketplaces serve an exclusively retail function – in which
transactions take place only with customers who are drug users
buying for their personal use – then the drug diffusing capacity of
cryptomarkets will be created only for those customers, and
increased only as more drug users make purchases there. On the
other hand, if cryptomarkets involve wholesale level purchases by
those involved in proﬁtable resale or social supply activities within
friendship networks, then the drug diffusing capacity of these
online marketplaces is substantially increased: cryptomarket-
sourced drugs become available even to drug users who are not
themselves cryptomarket customers.
Aims
The main aim of this paper is to characterize the supply side of
one drug cryptomarket, SR1. This will be accomplished in three
ways. Firstly, we assess the relative importance of wholesale
versus retail transactions on the marketplace, providing an
indication of the location in the market hierarchy that this drug
cryptomarket occupied. To do so, we use a revised approach to
assessing wholesale level transactions than employed in our
working paper (Aldridge & De´cary-He´tu, 2014). Secondly, we
examine the speciﬁc drug types associated with wholesale
transactions. Doing so will shed light on the particular drugs for
which cryptomarkets may particularly facilitate wholesale level
diffusion into local drug markets. Thirdly, we examine the
countries of operation for vendors that drove the wholesale
transactions in this marketplace.
Methodology
Ourmethodology is that of using ‘digital traces’ (De´cary-He´tu &
Aldridge, 2015) in the form of monitoring online dark net
marketplace activity by crawling and then scraping the data that
result.
Data collection
Our data were collected from SR1. Although this marketplace
has now been closed by law enforcement and new markets have
taken its place, there remain substantial advantages to providing
our analyses in connection to this market. SR1 was the ﬁrst
major and successful drug cryptomarket on which later markets
have been modeled. It was growing at the time of our data
collection (Aldridge & De´cary-He´tu, 2014), and unlike market-
places since, was not at the time hampered by the mistrust
associated with marketplace closures due to law enforcementactivities, marketplaces scams and external hacks that have
been rife in successor marketplaces (Aldridge & De´cary-He´tu,
2016). Our results reported here therefore provide a useful
baseline for comparison to assess how later marketplaces have
evolved and changed.
We created our ownweb crawler, DATACRYPTO (De´cary-He´tu &
Aldridge, 2013), to fetch each of the nearly 11,000 web pages
containing listings for the sale of drugs on SR1. Our crawler started
from the SR1 home page, indexed the content of the web page for
each listing and downloaded them. As the listings contained
hyperlinks to vendor proﬁles, our web crawler also followed and
automatically downloaded these. Data were collected between the
13th and the 15th of September 2013. Some vendors retained
listings for drugs that were out of stock, and we learned from
carefully reading their listings that to discourage buyers from
making orders, it was common practice to raise the price by at least
anorderofmagnitude.Doing so allowedvendors to retain the listing
until new stock again became available – and critically – to retain
positive customer feedback for those listings, thereby encouraging
more sales when fresh stock arrived. The extreme values in these
highly priced listings would have skewed our results. Soska and
Christin (2015) beneﬁted frombeing able to track listing prices over
time to help identify holding prices, but because our data are cross-
sectional, we were unable to take this approach. Soska and Christin
(2015) also used an automated heuristic that involved removing
some high and low priced listings based on price (e.g. over $10,000
USD). We elected not to take this approach, after having discerned
through a close inspection that many were ‘legitimate’ even where
these diverged to an extent from modal prices within drug
categories. In order not to exclude listings that had been
intentionally highly priced by vendors for sale, but to exclude those
using high prices to deter purchases – critical for our analysis, so as
not to over-estimate wholesale transactions – we inspected all
listings priced over USD $10,000 (n = 103), and excluded those
where vendors referred speciﬁcally to using these as ‘holding prices’
to deter customers from placing orders (n = 51). The remaining
highly priced items (n = 52) were all for very high quantities
(weights of a kilo or more), with the exception of some psychedelic
drugs (such an NBOMe compounds typically measured in micro-
grams) and prescription medications (typically sold in milligram
quantities), but these alsowere appropriately high quantity listings.
This generated data on 1031 vendors and 10,927 active listings for
items in the ‘drugs’ section of Silk Road.
For the analyses in this paper, we did not rely on the drug
categories intowhich vendors had placed their listings, aswe did in
our working paper (Aldridge & De´cary-He´tu, 2014) because having
done so resulted in inaccuracies thatwe identiﬁed after thoroughly
cleaning and checking the drug categories. We took the following
decisions. The major drug category for ‘prescription drugs’ in
Table 1 of the results includes all drugs that were described by
vendors as prescription drugs, even though some of these drugs
are, for example, also opioids (e.g. oxycodone pills), or stimulants
(e.g. methamphetamine pills), and even where vendors did not
themselves place these products in the SR1’s ‘prescription’
drug category. The ‘opioid’ category in Table 1 contains primarily
heroin, alongside opium, and other non-prescription opioids. The
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prescription stimulants (e.g. cocaine, amphetamine sulphate). We
look particularly at ‘crystal meth’ (when sold as such, and so
excluding methamphetamine pills) and ‘heroin’ in Table 2. This
approach ensured that all similar drug types were categorized
similarly across the entire dataset. Although there are multiple
ways researchers may wish to categorize drug types sold on
cryptomarkets, we strongly recommend, therefore, not relying on
the categories intowhich vendors themselves place their listings to
accomplish this.
Measurements
We converted the price of a listing from bitcoins to $USD at the
rate of $125.10, the average exchange rate on the days of data
collection taken from the BTC-e.com exchange. Listings were
divided into four categories: those priced at (1) $100.00 or less; (2)
$100.01 to $500.00; (3) $500.01 to $1000.00; and (4) over
$1000.00. The higher the price of a drug transaction, the more
likely that those transactions would have been initiated by
customers intending ofﬂine distribution. It is not possible to
determine, on the basis of the price of a transaction alone –without
asking buyers themselves – whether a purchase is for resale or for
use. An ounce or two of herbal cannabis can, for example, be the
purchase of someone stocking up for daily personal use, or
purchase for proﬁtable resale, or resale alongside personal use, or a
‘social supply’ purchase for sharing in friendship groups where
proﬁt is not the key motive (or indeed all of these).
We elected not to take a literature-derived approach to
estimating typical wholesale transactions made by retail level
dealers for a few reasons. Research documenting actual/typical
wholesale transactions among retail drug dealers is fairly limited.
What research does exist demonstrates such wide variation that
any estimates we might derive could be misleading. Taking results
reported by Caulkins and Reuter (1998), for example, we see that of
the 32 retail drug dealers in their sample, their (sometimes
inferred) wholesale purchase price had a mean of (USD) $480, a
median of $180, and ranged from $30 to $3000. AssociatedTable 2
Estimated monthly revenue for selected drug categoriesa by listing price.
N Price Sum of estimated monthly re
Cannabis
(N=2493)
1235 <$100 $431,752
848 $100.01–$500.00 $838,778
199 $500.01–$1000.00 $285,557
211 $1000.00+ $482,126
Ecstasy
(N=1045)
341 <$100 $123,813
364 $100.01–$500.00 $497,263
119 $500.01–$1000.00 $237,821
221 $1000.00+ $754,944
Opioids
(N=172)
71 <$100 $62,944
73 $100.01–$500.00 $193,751
12 $500.01–$1000.00 $10,540
16 $1000.00+ $17,736
Prescription
(N=3842)
2024 <$100 $229,135
1466 $100.01–$500.00 $476,318
202 $500.01–$1000.00 $109,598
150 $1000.00+ $184,821
Psychedelics
(N=1364)
701 <$100 $203,277
431 $100.01–$500.00 $307,215
111 $500.01–$1000.00 $79,227
121 $1000.00+ $122,856
Stimulants
(N=1071)
326 <$100.00 $147,177
452 $100.01–$500.00 $668,580
145 $500.01–$1000.00 $287,728
148 $1000.00+ $227,504
a The table excludes tobacco, production and cutting agents, and drugs categorizedquantities of wholesale purchase varied similarly. This wide
variation has also been noted more recently in connection to retail
dealers of recreational drugs in the UK (Taylor & Potter, 2013). In
other words, this research teaches us, not that ‘wholesale purchase
quantities start about here’, but that drug dealers vary enormously
in how much they buy when they source stock. We also have no
idea how closely online retail purchases might mirror stock-
sourcing purchase patterns for dealers in ofﬂine markets. For
example, would cryptomarket customers making wholesale
purchases do so more or less often than their ofﬂine counterparts?
This sort of gap in our understanding makes literature-derived
estimates of wholesale transaction size on drug cryptomarkets
even shakier. Our decision is further inﬂuenced by those who point
to the ‘blurred’ boundary between social supply and retail sales
(e.g. Chatwin & Potter, 2014). We therefore side-step all of this
ambiguity and take a simple, and intentionally arbitrary, approach
to distinguishing wholesale from retail transactions on SR1.
Using the four categories of drug listing price, we categorize
wholesale level transactions as those over $1000. It is of course
possible that transactions at this level will include some customers
sourcing supply for personal use or social supply. However, we
expect that amajority of transactions conducted for drugs priced at
this level will be initiated by customers intent on proﬁtable re-sale
or social supply. We acknowledge too that transactions for lower
priced drug purchases (for example, between $500 and $1000)may
also include stock-sourcing transactions. Our arbitrary – and
undoubtedly conservative – criterion of ‘over $10000 provides a
useful baseline of comparison for other researchers to assess how
later marketplaces have evolved and changed in this regard.
Although wholesale transactions might instead be ascertained
with reference to the quantity of a purchase, similar problems to
those identiﬁed above apply (e.g. the frequency with which a
customer intending ofﬂine distribution makes restocking pur-
chases). Indeed, price may be a better indicator given that what
might be a wholesale quantity for one drug (measured in terms of
weight) might not for another. For example, some psychedelic
compounds are typically measured and sold in microgramsvenues Market share
21% Total estimated monthly revenues: $2,038,213
41%
14% Market share of listings over $500: 38%
24%
8% Total estimated monthly revenues: $1,613,840
31%
15% Market share of listings over $500: 62%
47%
22% Total estimated monthly revenues: $284,972
68%
4% Market share of listings over $500: 10%
6%
23% Total estimated monthly revenues: $999,872
48%
11% Market share of listings over $500: 29%
18%
29% Total estimated monthly revenues: $712,574
43%
11% Market share of listings over $500: 28%
17%
11% Total estimated monthly revenues: $1,330,989
50%
22% Market share of listings over $500: 39%
17%
as ‘other’.
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measured and sold in grams (e.g. cocaine and DMT). Even those
sold in grams can be dosed and re-dosed at very different rates,
such that a few grams of DMT might be much more likely to be
purchased for redistribution than a few grams of cocaine might be.
Making the individual decisions required to ascertain what might
be considered wholesale quantities across the many hundreds of
different drug types available on cryptomarkets becomes a near
impossible task, not least because of the limited information
available to guide decision-making in this regard for the many NPS
(‘novel psychoactive substances’) entering these and othermarkets
(Corazza et al., 2013). Making comparisons across drugs with
regard to wholesale/retail therefore becomes even more problem-
atic. The advantage of using price to estimate wholesale
purchasing is that the can-of-worms opened when looking at
quantities is effectively side-stepped.
Looking to legal deﬁnitions for guidance in determining ‘supply’
level quantities was unhelpful. Threshold quantities established
for supply offences where these exist across European countries
vary enormously, with thresholds for ecstasy, for example, being
triggered at points ranging from 1 g (in Hungary) to 450 g (in
Austria) (EMCDDA, 2015). Trafﬁcable threshold quantities for
heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine and MDMA in most Australian
states amount to no more than a few grams for each drug, and
although Australian users typically consume less than these
amounts in a typical session, users in a ‘heavy session’ often
consumed in excess of quantities potentially triggering a drug
supply offence (Hughes, Ritter, Cowdery, & Phillips, 2014). In the
USA, base sentencing guidelines for federal trafﬁcking cases (that
is, trafﬁcking across state borders) indicate thresholds starting at
comparatively higher quantities for some drugs (e.g. 10 g of heroin
and 50 g for cocaine), but very low for some others (e.g. 0.5 g pure
methamphetamine) (United States Sentencing Commission, 2014).
Research on US incarcerated drug offenders conﬁrms that
quantities involved could be substantial for trafﬁckers in federal
prisons (median of 186 standard retail amounts), but much lower
in state prisons (4 standard retail units which, by illustration for
cocaine, equals 2 g) (Sevigny & Caulkins, 2004). Given that the
majority of US trafﬁcking offences occur at the state level (Caulkins
& Chandler, 2006), legal deﬁnitions for drug supply activities in the
USA also appear to include fairly small quantities. In short, legal
thresholds that trigger supply offences are unlikely to be useful
indicators for retail level source-stocking quantities, and will lead
to over-estimations of wholesale transactions.
We nevertheless present data on quantities of drugs listed for
sale. We created an algorithm to convert all listed weights to
grams. In the case of listings for pills, we enlisted the help of a
pharmacist who weighed different concentrations of nine types of
prescription pills (Xanax, Viagra, Valium, Oxycodone, Cialis,
Clonazepam, Modaﬁnil, Lorazepam and Levitra). These types of
prescription pills represented 39% of all prescription pill listings.
Their weights varied from 0.05 to 0.61 g per pill with a mean of
0.19 g (SD = 0.14; CV = 0.71). We used the same average weight for
ecstasy tablets. Given the limited variance in weight, this mean
was multiplied by the number of pills in the listing.
In order to assess the relative importance of transactions at the
wholesale level, we calculated an estimate of monthly revenues
generated by each listing based on the number of customer
reviews held for each listing, with a sum of all reviews operating as
a proxy for transactions generated by the listing. We then
multiplied the number of transactions in the last 31 days for a
listing by its price to derive an estimate of monthly revenue
generated by the listing. The count of customer reviews closely
mirrors actual transactions for a listing. To ascertain this, we
summed reviews across all a vendor’s listings and compared the
result to SR1’s own ‘vendor transactions’ metric. We did so only forvendors for whom SR1’s ownmetric indicated sales totalling fewer
than 300, since this was the top score for SR1’smetric. Doing so, we
found that our transaction count using customer reviewers
captured 88% of SR1’s ‘vendor transactions’ metric, suggesting
that our method captures most of the transactions likely to have
been generated by a listing; that is, most customers tended to give
feedback on their purchases. Leaving feedback was, moreover,
strongly encouraged by vendors in their listings. Nevertheless, our
transaction count for listings will exclude our estimated 12% of
transactions made by customers who did not leave feedback, as
well as the unknowable number of ‘stealth’ listings not publicly
available. Our measure of estimated monthly revenues should not
be interpreted as reﬂecting actual revenues over the period, as
some vendors will have been relative newcomers. Our revenue
variable should therefore be interpreted as a metric for the relative
importance of the different levels of prices of listings. It allows us to
address our aims by examining estimated monthly revenue
generation at the wholesale level for drugs across all listings,
within drug categories and speciﬁc drug types, and by country in
which vendors are based.
Results
For all drugs sold on SR1, just under half (49%) of all listings
were priced under $100. Although by far themost numerous, these
listings generated only 17% of estimated monthly revenues. The
greatest proportion of estimated revenuewas generated by listings
in the $100–$500 range (43%), and although some of these
purchases will have included customers sourcing stock for
proﬁtable resale, many will also have been drug users making
purchases for personal or shared use. Taking all transactions for
purchases priced over $1000, 26% of all estimatedmonthly revenue
generated on SR1 was derived from wholesale-level transactions.
Wholesale level transactions by quantity
Table 1 shows the mean weight of drugs listed for sale across
the four price categories we created. The mean weight of a drug
listed for sale increased as price increased, with listings priced over
$1000 having a mean weight of 402.17 g. Given that weights in the
price category below ($500–$1000) were less than a quarter
(90.29 g) of that found for our $1000wholesale criteria cut-off, this
ﬁnding provides some validation for our approach to designating
wholesale transactions as those above $1000.
Drugs associated with wholesale level transactions
Table 2 shows, for each of the six major drug categories
included, the number of listings in each price category, the
estimated monthly transactions and revenue, and the proportion
of overall revenue generated within each listing price category.
Wholesale activity was more substantial for some drug
categories than others. This was greatest for drugs in the ‘ecstasy’
category (just over $750,000); representing 42% of estimated
wholesale revenue across all the drug categories presented, and
47% of estimated wholesale revenue for ecstasy sales. Cannabis
followed with nearly $500,000 in estimated revenue generated by
wholesale level transactions, nearly a quarter of the revenue for the
cannabis category. Psychedelics, prescription drugs, and stimu-
lants each generated less than $230,000 in wholesale level
revenues, with wholesale revenues representing less than 20%
of the estimated revenues within each of these categories. Opioids
had the fewest listings overall, generated only just over $17,000 in
wholesale level revenue, and the proportion of revenue that was
wholesale for opioids was only 6%.
Table 3
Estimated monthly revenue for speciﬁc drug types priced over USD $1000.
Number of
listings
priced
$1000 USD+
Share
of all
listings
Estimated
monthly
revenues
Market
share
Herbal cannabis 127 10% $420,250 28%
MDMA powder/crystal 81 21% $342,500 44%
Ecstasy pills 76 17% $217,250 40%
MDMA-typea 64 29% $195,167 66%
Benzodiazepines 47 5% $148,417 33%
Prescription stimulantsb 83 10% $102,583 22%
Phenethylaminesc 72 12% $101,667 42%
Cocaine 56 14% $71,000 11%
Crystal meth 26 15% $62,250 21%
Ketamine 13 13% $37,417 23%
Other cannabis productsd 23 4% $33,583 16%
Hash 31 6% $28,333 9%
Prescription opioidse 68 10% $23,333 8%
Heroin 9 8% $17,750 6%
LSD/other lysergides 9 4% $15,833 6%
Tryptaminesf 39 8% $5333 3%
a MDA, 5-ap and 6-ap compounds, and methylone.
b Adderall, Modaﬁnil, methamphetamine pills, ephedrine, phentermine, dexe-
drine.
c NBOMe compounds, 2-c compounds, 3-c compounds, allylescaline, proscaline,
DOM and DOC.
d Edibles, extracts and seeds.
e Oxycodone, Tramadol, hydrocodone, Fenantyl, morphine, methadone, bupre-
norphine codeine.
f DMT (and related) compounds, ayahuasca, mushrooms (and related).
Table 4
Estimated monthly revenue by vendor country for listings priced over USD $1000.
Number of listings
priced $1000 USD+
Share of all
listings
Estimated
monthly
revenues
Market
share
USA 165 5% $440,500 24%
Netherlands 131 12% $365,917 20%
Canada 108 15% $302,750 16%
China 182 46% $224,167 12%
UK 84 7% $160,333 9%
Australia 51 7% $132,750 7%
Germany 73 14% $116,667 6%
Belgium 13 20% $99,750 5%
Sweden 9 3% $5333 <1%
Spain 26 6% $2667 <1%
India 14 1% $1167 <1%
J. Aldridge, D. De´cary-He´tu / International Journal of Drug Policy 35 (2016) 7–1512Table 3 contains the speciﬁc drug types that generated any
wholesale-level revenue. The table includes, for listings priced over
$1000: the number, their share of total listings for the drug type,
estimated monthly revenues and the market share for the drug
type.
Herbal cannabis generated the highest revenue of any single
drug, in contrast to the other cannabis type drugs that generated
much less (hash and other cannabis products). The largest
wholesale level revenues were generated for drugs typically
characterized as ‘party’ drugs. ‘Ecstasy’ type drugs generated the
greatest wholesale-level revenue, taken together: MDMA-type
pills, MDMA powder/crystal and ecstasy pills; and these drugs had
themost substantial levels of wholesalemarket share. Other ‘party’
and psychedelic drugs generated less wholesale revenue: phe-
nethylamines, ketamine, LSD, and tryptamines.
Cocaine and prescription stimulants are associated with both
‘party’ use and as drugs of dependency. These generated
substantial wholesale revenue in the mid-range of our ﬁndings.
Crack cocaine in contrast, although sold on SR1, generated no
wholesale revenue and so is absent in the table. Drugs associated
with dependency and self-medication also generated wholesale
revenue. Benzodiazepines generated the highest wholesale rev-
enues after recreational/party drugs. Wholesale activity was also
evident for crystal meth, prescription opioids, and heroin, but had
substantially less wholesale revenue than found for recreational
and party drugs.
Countries associated with wholesale level transactions
Table 4 lists the countries from which vendors shipped drugs
that generated anywholesale-level revenue. The table includes, for
listings priced over $1000: their number, their share of total
listings for each country, and estimated monthly revenues and
market share for each country.
Vendors were located in 41 countries around the world, but
wholesale level transactions were restricted to vendors in only
11 countries. The USA had the highest level of wholesale revenuegeneration, closely followed by the Netherlands and Canada.
Sweden, Spain and India generated comparatively very little
revenue fromwholesale level transactions. China stands out in the
table because nearly half (46%) of the listings for vendors in this
country were priced at the wholesale level, compared to
substantially fewer in all other countries. Belgium and Germany
are also notable in this regard, although, overall revenue
generation and wholesale share of listings was less than for China.
Discussion
Cryptomarkets offer a completely new distribution channel for
illicit drugs. Their growth in and resilience to law enforcement
efforts and marketplace scams (see Soska & Christin, 2015)
suggests that the importance of cryptomarkets for illicit drug
purchasing is likely to increase in coming years. We began by
characterizing drug cryptomarkets as ‘anonymous open’ market-
places that allow retail drug dealers to transcend the geographical
limitations of ‘closed’ ofﬂine drug markets, potentially increasing
the diffusion of drugs into locations in which they were previously
unavailable, or where availability was limited. Cryptomarkets may
therefore have the potential to kickstart changes in the patterns
and prevalence of drug use in the locations they are sold. Our
analysis focused on one of the mechanisms through which this
might occur: the cryptomarket as a wholesale marketplace.
The mechanisms through which an anonymous open drug
market can facilitate drug diffusion will depend on whether these
marketplaces serve a wholly retail function, or whether they also
supply wholesale stock for redistribution. Initial characterizations
of cryptomarkets in the literature implied a retail marketplace
location (Barratt, 2012; Christin, 2013; Martin, 2013). In contrast,
we estimate that around one quarter of the revenue generated on
SR1 resulted from wholesale priced transactions. Our ﬁndings
therefore suggest that cryptomarkets may be understood as a
virtual broker, linking wholesalers with ofﬂine retail-level
distributors. This is an important ﬁnding because wholesale
activity may increase the capacity of cryptomarkets to diffuse
drugs across locales – therefore reaching even drug users who are
not themselves cryptomarket customers. This can occur as a result
of cryptomarket customers who are themselves drug dealers or
user-dealers making large purchases for proﬁtable ofﬂine resale
(Aldridge & De´cary-He´tu, 2014), or by customers making
purchases for minimally commercial social supply among friend-
ship groups (Coomber & Moyle, 2013). Drug diffusion across
locales might also be facilitated by cryptomarkets via drug users
making personal use-sized purchases; but diffusion will remain
fairly limited until we see much more substantial increases in
purchases made by drug users than we currently ﬁnd (see Barratt
et al., 2014).
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capacity to facilitate drug diffusion, for which drugs is this most
likely? Our ﬁndings pointed to ecstasy as the big wholesale story
on SR1, both in terms of overall revenue and relative proportion of
sales at this level. After herbal cannabis, we found other ‘party’
drugswere also important at thewholesale level, including a broad
range of psychedelic drugs. The fact that wholesale transactions
were as concentrated as we found them to be in the Netherlands,
Belgium and China may be related to these countries being
producer countries for these drugs (UNODC, 2014) and thus well
placed to transact with customers at the wholesale level. Martin
(2013) suggested that cryptomarkets may link vendors in
producing countries directly with consumers; our results suggest
thatwhere this occurs, it will at least in part bemediated as a result
of this drug cryptomarket operating at the middle level of the
market, rather than (only) through bypassing it. We are already
witnessing the diversiﬁcation and expansion in the production,
trade, supply routes and user-base locations for ecstasy and other
amphetamine-type drugs (UNODC, 2014), and for cannabis
(UNODC, 2015). Given the sizeable and predominant wholesale
trade for these drugs that we found on SR1, it is possible that
cryptomarkets may function to further this diversiﬁcation and
expansion, at least in part by diffusing these substances to
locations where supply routes have yet to be established.
The extent to which cryptomarkets may link vendors located in
countries where these drugs are produced, synthesized or
cultivated with customers around the world may be speciﬁc to
certain drug types. It is perhaps not surprising that we saw a
predominance of widespread wholesale activity for herbal
cannabis, given its now global cultivation (UNODC, 2015) and
for ecstasy-type drugs that are manufactured synthetically. In
contrast, the utility of cryptomarkets as suitable for vendors in
producer countries for drugs like heroin or cocaine seems likely to
be limited at best. The production of these drugs involves multiple
stages of cultivation and reﬁnement in areas (e.g. Afghanistan,
South America) which, as Martin (2014, p. 58) points out, lack ‘‘the
techno-logical infrastructure necessary to sell goods via a
cryptomarket such as internet-enabled computers and secure
postal systems’’. It seems likely therefore that cryptomarkets may
only partially mirror the structure of existing (albeit shifting)
global drug distribution trafﬁcking routes from ‘producer’ to
‘consumer’ countries.
Barratt et al. (2014) found that survey respondents who used
SR1 often cited the range of drugs available to them as key in their
decision to make purchases there. We found that wholesale
activitywas substantial for speciﬁc drug types that included awide
range of individual compounds (e.g. psychedelic phenethylamines,
tryptamines, and ‘MDMA-type’ drugs), many ﬁrst synthesized by
Alexander Shulgin (Shulgin & Shulgin, 1991, 1997) but individually
often rare and difﬁcult to access in local ofﬂine markets. To the
extent that cryptomarket customers include drug dealers, social
suppliers, or user-dealers sourcing stock for ofﬂine distribution,
local ofﬂine drug markets may also be transformed by creating
access to a wider range of drugs available for purchase, particularly
for rarer substances.
Although herbal cannabis and party drugs were dominant in
terms of wholesale activity on SR1, some drugs associated with
dependence and self-medication were evident: wholesale transac-
tions for benzodiazepines and prescription stimulants were
substantial, and generated estimated revenue exceeded only by
herbal cannabis and ecstasy-type drugs. Cocaine, crystal meth,
heroin and prescription opioids generated wholesale revenue,
albeit in lesser amounts. We can speculate that the characteristics
associated with particular drug types may make them easier or
more risky to package and ship in wholesale quantities (e.g. odour,
bulk, perceived detectability) and perhaps drive vendor decisionsto supply these drugs online given the requirement for postal
delivery. However, it was not obvious in our analysis that drug
characteristics one might expect to deter vendors from making
wholesale shipments did so: herbal cannabis in particular (known
for its strong odour) generated substantial bulk sales. Our reading
of the discussion forum associated to SR1 suggested that vendors
used a range of packaging strategies to disguise odour.
Limitations of our study and directions for future research
There are limitations to what we can learn about the capacity
for drug cryptomarkets to contribute to drug diffusion using the
digital trace methodology we employed. Although vendors do list
where they are willing to ship their drugs, data generated by
customer reviews do not allow us to identify the countries inwhich
customers were based. This ‘supply side’ only approach limits the
utility of cryptomarket data to give us the full picture of drug
diffusion. Relatedly, some customers making stock sourcing
purchases for re-distribution may do so for redistribution on the
very same marketplace – or in the post SR1 era, on competing
cryptomarkets. Where this occurs, the drug diffusion facilitated by
wholesale cryptomarket purchasing will not occur in local ofﬂine
markets. Future researchers should attempt to ascertain the extent
to which the drugs purchased through cryptomarkets are recycled
on those marketplaces. There is no way to determine this with the
supply side data researchers have available to them from
cryptomarkets, so other methods, like self-report surveys, will
be required.
One assumption we might make is that customers are likely to
prefer making domestic purchases, and vendors are likely to prefer
to make domestic shipments, with both parties seeking to reduce
the risks of interception at borders and the delays and increased
costs associated with international shipping (De´cary-He´tu,
Paquet-Clouston, & Aldridge, 2016). With this assumption in
mind, we might surmise that diffusion is likely to occur most
substantially within rather than across international boundaries.
Cryptomarkets have the theoretical capacity to create a uniﬁed and
global drug market; it seems likely, however, that even to the
extent that this occurs, cryptomarkets may also substantially
replicate, at the cross-country level, existing ofﬂine patterns of
distribution that are structured by international economic
relationships between countries (Boivin, 2014) and available
and evolving trafﬁcking routes (UNODC, 2012). The capacity for
drug cryptomarkets to transform local drugs markets may take
place as often within national boundaries, for example between
rural and urban areas, or among cities within individual countries.
Future research will need to employ survey or interview
techniques to ascertain the geographical locations of cryptomarket
customers in relation to the vendors from whom they purchase,
although the samples on which such methodologies are based will
lack the ‘full market’ picture that is a strength of digital trace
methodologies (De´cary-He´tu & Aldridge, 2015). A related and
potentially fruitful avenue for future research will be to establish
the preciseway inwhich drug cryptomarkets interactwith existing
and evolving ofﬂine global drug distribution trafﬁcking routes.
Our cut-off point (transactions for listings priced over $1000)
for assessing wholesale activity is arbitrary. Although we feel
reasonably conﬁdent in our conclusion that a substantial propor-
tion of revenue generated on SR1 was at the wholesale level, we
can have little conﬁdence that our precise estimates in this regard
are meaningful. Nevertheless, our ﬁnding that listing prices
corresponded in a predictable way to large quantity listings gives
us conﬁdence that highly priced listings were also high quantity
listings, with listings priced over USD $1000 having an average
weight of under half a kilo (402.17 g). Our approach provides other
researchers studying cryptomarkets with a simple criterion that
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cryptomarkets. There is no way to determine whether drugs are
intended for resale/social supply/use without asking customers
making their purchases, and so survey and interview methodolo-
giesmay shed light here, but given thewide range of price/quantity
transactions across drug dealers when they source stock (e.g.
Caulkins & Reuter, 1998; Taylor & Potter, 2013) doing so may not
take us far in developing any more precise estimates for
application using our digital trace methodology. The crude
approach we took here of using an arbitrary price cut-off has
some advantages over vastly more complex quantity-weight
driven approaches, but more research is required to establish
the complex relationship between price and quantity indicators in
stock-sourcing activities for retail level drug dealers, both online
and ofﬂine. Much research yet remains to be done to characterize
the range of sales made on drug cryptomarkets, whether stock-
sourcing or personal use purchasing, including how much
specialism we see by drug type (that is, the relative balance
between mono and poly-drug supply activities), and the use of
quantity discounts.
The ‘supply side’ data we employed for this study cannot shed
light on the population prevalence of drug use. Nevertheless, the
transactions and price data it contains provide something of a
‘mirror’ of demand side purchasing, and by extension, use. Sales on
drug cryptomarkets can be used to monitor the availability of
existing and new substances, and provide improvements to the
‘early warning’ approaches that have been criticized for failing to
provide useful warning until changes in drug consumption are
already embedded (Grifﬁths, Vingoe, Hunt, Mounteney, & Hartnoll,
2000). Although internet-derived data is now being used in drug
monitoring systems (e.g. Deluca et al., 2012) data from crypto-
markets provide added value here. By looking at the revenue
generated by the sales of particular drugs, as opposed only to those
listed for sale or discussed on internet drugs forums, we gain a
better insight into actual availability insofar as particular drugs
generate sales, and therefore use. This added value is further
increased when we focus on wholesale revenue generation,
providing a gauge of how cryptomarkets may be impacting drug
availability including and beyond those who access them as
customers. Cryptomarkets provide data not only on the type of
drugs offered for sale, but also the frequency of drug purchase – a
better indicator of availability – alongside their transaction price
and geographical origin. In theseways drug cryptomarkets provide
a rich source of drug monitoring data, and should therefore be
monitored closely to identify trends and patterns in purchasing,
and by extension, use. Future research would also beneﬁt by
comparing trends and patterns generated through the ‘digital
traces’ methodology we have employed, and comparing these to
population surveys that include questions about online drug
purchasing.
Because we see evidence that SR1 partly served a wholesale
market function, this means that where drug dealers source stock
for resale in local ofﬂine drugs markets, they conduct their supply
sourcing transactions in a ‘virtual’ location. An implication,
therefore, is the potential for drug cryptomarkets to reduce the
possibilities for violence that tend to be associated with ofﬂine
markets at the middle and upper levels (Caulkins & Reuter, 2009).
Traditional illicit markets do not have recourse to state institutions
to adjudicate disputes; cryptomarkets, themselves mini-ecosys-
tems, have their own regulatory mechanisms (escrow, seller and
buyer trust metrics, marketplace adjudication of disputes),
removing some of the unstable factors in illegal markets that
may otherwise give rise to conﬂict and violence. Our digital trace
methodology cannot measure violence or other forms of conﬂict
connected to transactions that take place on cryptomarkets, but
researchers using different methods could fruitfully examine thishypothesis. Barratt, Ferris, andWinstock (2014), employing survey
methodology, found that drug users making cryptomarket
purchases were less likely to report violence and threats than
those making ofﬂine purchases.
Although it may seem self-evident that the virtual location of
online drugs markets should reduce violence insofar as interac-
tions there occur in virtual rather than physical space, this
potential harm reduction capacity of cryptomarkets is likely to
have limitations. Cryptomarkets remain ‘anchored’ in ofﬂine drug
markets, with vendors there often purchasing drugs ofﬂine to sell
online, and stock-sourcing cryptomarket customers about to make
their retail sales in ofﬂine markets. These anchors in ofﬂine drugs
markets mean that cryptomarket users involved in drug supply
activities may still be victims and perpetrators of violence
connected to these face-to-face transactions. As well, harm can
manifest in ways other than physical violence: threats or damage
to reputation, ‘doxing’ (hacking and then threatening to expose
identity) and other forms of blackmail, theft and fraud, and cyber-
bullying. Finally, the violence associated to drug markets may be
culturally, politically and socially conditioned (Bourgois, 2003;
Johnson, Golub, & Dunlap, 2006) rather than arising solely as a
function of the illegal market itself. To the extent that these
external conditions remain unchanged, the ability of the crypto-
market to reduce violence and conﬂict, although promising, may
have limitations.
Acknowledgements
This project was funded in part by the Social Science and
Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) project ‘‘Innova-
teurs, se´curitaires et anonymes: les cryptomarche´s et leurs impacts
sur les marche´s de drogues illicites’’ (#430-2015-01089). We are
grateful toMikeMarcus for research assistance, discussion, and title
suggestion.
Conﬂict of interest: There are no conﬂicts of interest for either author.
References
Aldridge, J., & De´cary-He´tu, D. (2014). Not an ‘Ebay for Drugs’: The cryptomarket ‘‘Silk
Road’’ as a paradigm shifting criminal innovation. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2436643
Aldridge, J., & De´cary-He´tu, D. (2015). A response to Dolliver’s ‘‘Evaluating drug
trafﬁcking on the Tor Network: Silk Road 2, the sequel’’. International Journal of
Drug Policy, 26(11), 1124–1125.
Aldridge, J., & De´cary-He´tu, D. (2016). Cryptomarkets and the future of illicit drug
markets. In EMCDDA (Ed.), Internet and drug markets, EMCDDA insights (pp. 23–30).
Luxembourg: Publications Ofﬁce of the European Union.
Aldridge, J., Measham, F., &Williams, L. (2011). Illegal leisure revisited: Changing patterns
of alcohol and drug use in adolescents and young adults. London: Routledge.
Barratt, M. J. (2012). Silk Road: EBay for drugs. Addiction, 107(3), 683.
Barratt, M. J., Ferris, J. A., & Winstock, A. A. (2016). Safer scoring? Cryptomarkets,
threats to safety and interpersonal violence. International Journal of Drug Policy, 35,
24–31.
Barratt, M. J., Ferris, J. A., & Winstock, A. R. (2014). Use of Silk Road, the online drug
marketplace, in the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States. Addiction,
109(5), 774–783.
Boivin, R. (2014). Risks, prices, and positions: A social network analysis of illegal drug
trafﬁcking in the world-economy. International Journal of Drug Policy, 25(2),
235–243.
Bourgois, P. I. (2003). In search of respect: Selling crack in El Barrio (2nd ed.). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Branwen, G. (2014). DNMs: By the numbers. Retrieved from http://www.reddit.com/r/
DarkNetMarkets/comments/2r58vs/2014_in_dnms_by_the_numbers/
Caulkins, J. P., & Chandler, S. (2006). Long-run trends in incarceration of drug offenders
in the United States. Crime & Delinquency, 52(4), 619–641.
Caulkins, J. P., & Reuter, P. (1998). What price data tell us about drugmarkets. Journal of
Drug Issues, 28, 593–612.
Caulkins, J. P., & Reuter, P. (2009). Towards a harm-reduction approach to enforcement.
Safer Communities, 8(1), 9–23.
Chatwin, C., & Potter, G. (2014). Blurred boundaries: The artiﬁcial distinction netween
‘‘use’’ and ‘‘supply’’ in the U.K. cannabis market. Contemporary Drug Problems,
41(4), 536–550.
J. Aldridge, D. De´cary-He´tu / International Journal of Drug Policy 35 (2016) 7–15 15Christin, N. (2013). Traveling the Silk Road: A measurement analysis of a large anonymous
online marketplace. Paper Presented at the Proceedings of the 22nd International
Conference on World Wide Web.
Coomber, R., & Moyle, L. (2013). Beyond drug dealing: Developing and extending the
concept of ‘social supply’of illicit drugs to ‘minimally commercial supply’. Drugs:
Education, Prevention and Policy, 21(2), 157–164.
Corazza, O., Assi, S., Simonato, P., Corkery, J., Bersani, F. S., Demetrovics, Z., et al. (2013).
Promoting innovation and excellence to face the rapid diffusion of Novel Psycho-
active Substances in the EU: The outcomes of the ReDNet project. Human Psycho-
pharmacology: Clinical and Experimental, 28(4), 317–323.
Cox, J. (2016). Staying in the shadows: The use of bitcoin and encryption in crypto-
markets. In EMCDDA (Ed.), Internet and DrugMarkets, EMCDDA Insights (pp. 41–47).
Luxembourg: Publications Ofﬁce of the European Union.
De´cary-He´tu, D., & Aldridge, J. (2013). DATACRYPTO: The dark net crawler and scraper.
De´cary-He´tu, D., & Aldridge, J. (2015). Sifting through the net: Monitoring of online
offenders by researchers. European Review of Organised Crime, 2(2), 122–141.
De´cary-He´tu, D., Paquet-Clouston, M., & Aldridge, J. (2016). Going international. Risk
taking and the willingness to ship internationally among drug cryptomarket
vendors. International Journal of Drug Policy, 35, 69–76.
deepdotweb (2016). Updated: List of dark net markets (Tor & I2P). Retrieved
from https://www.deepdotweb.com/2013/10/28/updated-llist-of-hidden-
marketplaces-tor-i2p/
Degenhardt, L., Chiu, W.-T., Sampson, N., Kessler, R. C., Anthony, J. C., Angermeyer, M.,
et al. (2008). Toward a global view of alcohol, tobacco, cannabis, and cocaine use:
Findings from theWHOWorld Mental Health Surveys. PLoS Med, 5(7), 1053–1067.
Deluca, P., Davey, Z., Corazza, O., Di Furia, L., Farre, M., Flesland, L. H., et al. (2012).
Identifying emerging trends in recreational drug use: Outcomes from the Psycho-
naut Web Mapping Project. Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological
Psychiatry, 39(2), 221–226.
Dolliver, D. S. (2015a). Evaluating drug trafﬁcking on the Tor network: Silk Road 2, the
Sequel. International Journal of Drug Policy, 26(11), 1113–1123.
Dolliver, D. S. (2015b). A rejoinder to authors: Data collection on Tor. International
Journal of Drug Policy, 26(11), 1128–1129.
EMCDDA (2015). Threshold quantities for drug offences. Retrieved from http://www.
emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index99321EN.html-T2
Ferrence, R. (2001). Diffusion theory and drug use. Addiction, 96(1), 165–173.
Grifﬁths, P., Vingoe, L., Hunt, N., Mounteney, J., & Hartnoll, R. (2000). Drug information
systems, early warning, and new drug trends: Can drug monitoring systems
become more sensitive to emerging trends in drug consumption? Substance Use
& Misuse, 35(6–8), 811–844.
Harocopos, A., & Hough, M. (2005). Drug dealing in open-air markets.. US Department of
Justice: US Department of Justice, Ofﬁce of Community Oriented Policing Services.
Hughes, C., Ritter, A., Cowdery, N., & Phillips, B. (2014). Australian threshold quantities
for ‘drug trafﬁcking’: Are they placing drug users at risk of unjustiﬁed sanction?
Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.
Johnson, B., Golub, A., & Dunlap, E. (2006). The rise and decline of hard drugs, drug
markets, and violence in inner-city New York. In A. Blumstein & J. Wallman (Eds.),
The crime drop in America (pp. 164–206). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Lewman, A. (2016). Tor and links with cryptomarkets. In EMCDDA (Ed.), Internet and
drug markets, EMCDDA insights (pp. 33–40). Luxembourg: Publications Ofﬁce of the
European Union.
Martin, J. (2013). Lost on the Silk Road: Online drug distribution and the ‘cryptomarket’.
Criminology and Criminal Justice, 14(3), 351–367.
Martin, J. (2014). Drugs on the dark net: How cryptomarkets are transforming the global
trade in illicit drugs. Palgrave Macmillan.
May, T., & Hough, M. (2004). Drugmarkets and distribution systems. Addiction Research
and Theory, 12(6), 549–563.
Morselli, C., Turcotte, M., & Tenti, V. (2011). The mobility of criminal groups. Global
Crime, 12(3), 165–188.
Munksgaard, R., Demant, J., & Branwen, G. (2016). A replication and methodological
critique of the study ‘‘Evaluating drug trafﬁcking on the Tor Network’’. International
Journal of Drug Policy, 35, 92–96.
Reuter, P. (1983). Disorganized crime: The economics of the visible hand. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Reuter, P. (2009). Systemic violence in drug markets. Crime, Law and Social Change,
52(3), 275–284.
Rogers, E. M. (1983). Diffusion of innovations (3rd ed.). New York: Free Press.
Seddon, T. (2008). Drugs, the informal economy and globalization. Economics, 35(10),
717–728.
Sevigny, E. L., & Caulkins, J. P. (2004). Kingpins or mules: An analysis of drug
offenders incarcerated in federal and state prisons. Criminology & Public Policy,
3(3), 401–434.
Shulgin, A., & Shulgin, A. (1991). PiHKAL: A chemical love story. Berkeley, CA: Transform
Press.
Shulgin, A., & Shulgin, A. (1997). TiHKAL: The continuation. Berkeley, CA: Transform
Press.
Soska, K., & Christin, N. (2015). Measuring the longitudinal evolution of the online
anonymous marketplace ecosystem. Paper Presented at the USENIX Security ’15.
Taylor, M., & Potter, G. R. (2013). From ‘‘social supply’’ to ‘‘real dealing’’: Drift,
friendship, and trust in drug dealing careers. Journal of Drug Issues, 43(4),
392–406.
United States Sentencing Commission (2014). Chapter Two – Offense Conduct; Part D –
Offenses Involving Drugs and Narco-Terrorism. 2014 Guidelines Manual. Retrieved
from http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/2014/2014-chapter-2-d
UNODC (2012). World Drugs Report 2012. Vienna: United Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs and
Crime.
UNODC (2014). World Drug Report 2014. Vienna: United Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs and
Crime.
UNODC (2015). World Drug Report 2015. Vienna: United Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs and
Crime.
Van Buskirk, J., Roxburgh, A., Naicker, S., & Burns, L. (2015). Response to Dolliver –
Evaluating drug trafﬁcking on the Tor network. International Journal of Drug Policy,
26(11), 1113–1123.
Van Hout, M. C., & Bingham, T. (2014). Responsible vendors, intelligent consumers: Silk
Road, the online revolution in drug trading. International Journal of Drug Policy,
25(2), 183–189.
